A New Era for the Iranian Opposition

Donald Trump’s return to the White House presents a historic opportunity for opponents of the Islamic Republic in Iran. The US under Trump will likely adopt a much more hawkish policy toward the regime in Tehran by adopting a policy of “Maximum Pressure” which will include draconian economic sanctions and possibly military action against Iran’s nuclear and military facilities. Additionally, the regime has never been weaker—its “Axis of Resistance” lies in ruins, with Hezbollah decimated by Israel and the Assad regime overthrown by Syrian rebels. Much of Iran’s air defense network and sophisticated missile production sites were also destroyed by Israel.

The traditional Iranian opposition groups lining up for Trump’s favor are familiar to Washington insiders. They include the Mujaheddin-e Khalq Organization (MEK), a Marxist-Islamist cult that came to birth fighting the last Shah, fought for Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War, and now operates an organized and well-resourced lobbying operation in Washington. The MEK, while highly visible and persistent, has a miniscule constituency in Iran and the diaspora and is viewed by most Iranians with contempt.

The monarchist movement centered around the Shah’s eldest son, the former Crown Prince Reza Palavi, has also made some noise in Washington recently. Pahlavi’s star appeared to have risen in recent years as he rebranded himself a democrat and supported a referendum to determine his homeland’s future after the regime’s overthrow.

Pahlavi’s rebranding and his participation in the Georgetown opposition coalition attracted many Iranians beyond his traditional monarchist base and enabled him to be seen as a leading opposition figure during the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising.

However, his abrupt departure from the coalition after only three months and his return to his old brand as the Shah in waiting has damaged his credibility and popularity.

Unlike the MEK, Pahlavi lacks an organized network within and outside of Iran or even a professional staff that can lobby on his behalf in Washington. He behaves more as an Instagram celebrity than a serious and confident politician, while his advisors and supporters are hard at work smearing and undermining other opposition figures and activists, such as the anti-compulsory hejab activist Masih Alinejad and Nobel Peace Prize winner Nargess Mohammadi.

The MEK and the monarchists are not the only game in town, however. Iran’s ethnic lobbies also see an opportunity to strengthen their hand, among them being the Kurdish group Komala, led by the savvy and well-spoken Abdullah Mohtadi, another former member of the Georgetown coalition.

But it is simplistic to say that these are the only groups advocating for a policy on Iran. Numerous individual Iranian-Americans and relatively de-centralized networks have put enormous effort into changing Washington’s policies with some notable success, including getting the MAHSA Act passed by Congress, which imposes sanctions on the regime’s top leaders.

Trump’s policy on Iran will be heavily influenced by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Iranian monarchists may be heartened by Pahlavi’s 2023 visit to Israel and the warm reception by Netanyahu and other senior officials.

But Netanyahu is an intelligent and astute man. It is highly unlikely that he will back Pahlavi as the leader of the opposition or the successor to the regime.

The Israeli government is aware of Pahlavi’s limitations, including his lack of leadership skills. Israel also knows that the monarchist movement lacks an organized network. The Israelis have historically worked with organized groups that can carry out operations inside of Iran.

So why do Israeli politicians like Netanyahu meet with Pahlavi on occasion? Because many Israelis, especially Iranian-Israelis, feel nostalgic for a past Pahlavi era in which Israel and Iran were regional partners and when Jews lived freely in Iran. Many of the most fervently pro-Israeli Iranians are monarchists, although the monarchist/ultra-nationalist movement has its share of rabid anti-semites as well.

Hence, the Likud party’s courting of Pahlavi helps score political points with the Israeli electorate.

But Israel’s chief goal is the destruction of the Iranian nuclear program, and Jerusalem is likely to focus its support on groups like the MEK and Komal

a which can serve its interests. The monarchists can offer no help in achieving this objective.

Furthermore, Israel appears to have built a sophisticated and capable spy network within the regime which has been responsible for facilitating Israeli operations inside of Iran. A serious armed threat to Khamenei’s rule may come from within his regime. Everyday Iranians fed up with the regime may also take up arms after years of peaceful civil resistance, as demonstrated by the recent assassination of two senior Supreme Court judges by an employee of the court.

Neither Washington nor Jerusalem should feel bound by the existing opposition groups active in Washington, as many of these groups either lack legitimacy or the leadership and resources to be effective. And they spend most of their time and energy fighting each other rather than the regime.

Trump and Netanyahu should tread patiently and carefully, as new opposition groups and leaders are likely to emerge in Iran as the regime’s security apparatus becomes weaker with every passing day.